An analysis of the division of labour in maize post-production operations highlighted the significant role of women. Of the eleven main operations five are jointly carried out by women and men (harvesting, stacking, shelling, storing, milling); four are carried out mainly by women (cleaning, transport from field, grinding and pounding) and two are carried out mainly by men (transport from home to market and marketing). Men are also responsible for construction of storage structures.
Maize harvesting typically begins around mid-May and may continue up to the end of July. Two methods of hand harvesting are used by small- and medium-scale farmers. Individual cobs may be collected from the plant and may or may not be dehusked at the same time. In areas of high maize production where field sizes tend to be larger, it is more common to harvest the whole plant by cutting the stalk at the base. Stalks with cobs attached are then gathered into stooks in the field where they remain until the cobs are dry. Stooking is usually associated with early harvesting and has the advantage that fields, particularly the larger ones can be cleared quickly so that land can be prepared for the following crop.
When dry, cobs are removed from the stalks, with or without dehusking, after which they may be heaped temporarily in the field or transported immediately to the homestead. Cobs are dehusked if maize is intended for sale; maize for home consumption usually remains in husk.
Many farmers delay harvesting as long as possible to allow the crop to dry. In areas where crop diversification is increasing, such as Kalomo and Chibombo, harvesting may be extended because of the need to tend alternative crops and this has implications for increased levels of loss. Maize remaining in the field long after maturity may be attacked by termites, rodents, birds, domestic animals and storage insects. When harvested very late, cobs may be so dry that they shell easily and grains are lost as cobs are removed from the plant. No estimates of the extent of this loss could be given by farmers but they generally considered it to be within tolerable limits. Such losses might be reduced by early harvesting but most farmers interviewed felt that this would be unachievable because of labour constraints, the need to construct additional drying platforms or cribs or simply because the losses were unimportant.
Figure 1. Maize Post-Production System
Maize may be dried in the field (i.e. by delayed harvesting), by stooking
or by stacking cobs on platforms. Field drying is common in all the districts
visited although stooking is common in high maize producing areas of Kalomo
and Kaoma Districts. Initial drying on the field after harvest is insufficient
for long term storage and drying platforms are often used by farmers who
produce surpluses for sale. It is reported by FCSU that some drying platforms
are too wide to allow efficient drying; the cobs at the top and sides may
dry quickly to a safe moisture content but, because of poor ventilation,
the cobs in the middle do not dry well and may become damaged by mould.
Similarly, cob maize stored at high moisture content in cribs may be damaged
by mould if there is inadequate ventilation. FCSU advises that cobs with
high moisture content should be stored in a rectangular crib (of West-African
design) see box 1. However, farmers interviewed during this mission did
not regard mould as a serious problem and felt that the existing system
met their requirements. Mould damage was occasionally a problem in years
of untimely (late rains) but this did not justify investment in new structures.
| Box 1. Drying Cribs
FCSU has made no cost comparison between of the rectangular crib and traditional drying platforms and cribs. Discussion with staff of FCSU led to the conclusion that the cost of the rectangular crib is likely to be higher than for traditional stores, (especially drying platforms) when cost of thatch, the high timber content and metal for rodent guards are taken into account. An advantage of the crib is that it has an expected life of 10 years compared to the temporary drying platform, which is constructed new every year, and the traditional crib which may last for 5-7 years. In Kalomo District, the current cost of a of 25 bag capacity drying platform is around K12,000 and a basket type crib, between K30,000 and K35,000. Annual repairs to this crib (mainly the cost of labour for thatching) would be about K5,000. No cost was attached to thatching material, as this could be gathered locally by family labour. |
Before liberalisation drying platforms were built in the field as farmers did not need to keep maize for sale at the homestead. Since early sales at harvest are no longer guaranteed farmers report an increased risk of theft of cobs when they remain for long periods on platforms in the field. In the interests of security some farmers in Kalomo now construct platforms at the homestead but theft may still occur. In this situation a rectangular crib might provide more security but the full benefits of adopting the structure could be achieved only if it was used for long term storage of maize, i.e. replacing both the drying platform and the traditional crib.
Three methods of maize shelling were identified: beating of cobs placed inside a sack; beating of cobs placed on a screened, slatted platform, so that loose grain falls between the slats into a collecting pit; and shelling machines. Beating of cobs results in breakage and cracking of some grains thus rendering them more susceptible to insect attack in store. Manual shelling is labour intensive and is carried out by both men and women. Estimates of the time taken to shell by hand varied but on average it took 2-3 people one day to shell five 90 kg bags of maize. The intensive labour requirement for shelling was cited by farmers in Kalomo District as an important reason why they had reduced the area of maize (before liberalisation they had access to shellers through the Co-operatives). A few large-scale and commercial farmers have maize sheller attachments on tractors or free-standing hand-operated shelling machines and these may be available for hire at a cost of around K1,000 per 90kg bag of shelled maize.
Those farmers who have previous experience of maize shellers agreed
that the quality of the maize was superior to that of hand shelled (beaten)
maize. Farmers in all districts expressed interest in using shelling machines
in view of the benefits of improved grain quality and savings in time and
labour but seemed unaware that competitively priced machines are readily
available in Lusaka. This potential demand for shelling machines and opportunities
for their introduction (for example, through the SPFS or NGO-assisted programmes)
requires further investigation (see Box 2).
| Box 2. Potential benefits of introducing hand-operated maize shelling
machines
Hand operated maize shelling machines with a capacity of 20 x 90kg bags per day (based on a working day of eight hours) currently retail at around K200,000 in Lusaka. Potential benefits include: Savings in time and/or labour - Assuming 3 people work the machine for 1 day, they can shell 20 bags
of maize.
- Assuming a daily wage rate of K1,000, shelling 20 bags of maize by
machine would cost
Reduction in losses - The shelling machine will cause less breakage to grains and fewer
small fragments will be
- Cobs can be shelled faster and so cobs in holding platforms will be
exposed to the risk of
Increase in income - Possibility of hiring machine to neighbours (current hire rates of up to K1,000 per bag) - Reduced risk of rejection of maize by traders on grounds of poor quality - In the long term, if higher price paid for good quality maize (fewer brokens) Increase in maize production - High labour requirement for hand-shelling was a reason given for reduction in area of maizecultivation |
Maize is cleaned or winnowed soon after shelling and before bagging or storage. Previously, maize offered to NAMBOARD or the Co-operatives had to be cleaned to conform to an official grading standard but since liberalisation, grading standards have been abolished, (with the exception of maize destined for the Food Reserve Agency (FRA). Consequently, many small-scale farmers no longer pay particular attention to cleaning of maize.
Maize traders complain about the quality of the maize offered by farmers and it is now common for traders to demand up to 110kg of maize at the rate for a 90kg bag to compensate for high levels of impurities and foreign matter. Some farmers seemed to think that the system is now becoming entrenched and they see little point in spending time in cleaning their maize.
There is an increasing awareness in the trade of the need to supply good quality (clean) maize. The long distance truckers and traders who collect maize from urban markets and sell at major market centres or to commercial mills now demand clean, dry, uninfested maize. There is widespread opinion among traders that national grading standards should be reintroduced (although realistically such standards are not enforceable in an internal, informal trading system). In the absence of such standards some traders have introduced new terms of trade whereby all grain offered by farmers is weighed by the bucket thus affording an opportunity to inspect for poor quality maize.
A distinction must be made between the two types of maize grown separately in most Provinces. White maize is the major staple grain in Zambia for both the rural and urban consumers (respectively around 45 and 55 percent of the total). Traditional varieties are grown, without the use of fertiliser, using seed retained by the farmer from one season to the next. These varieties are characteristically low-yielding, long maturing, hard, flinty types with good husk cover. Throughout the mission, farmers confirmed that these varieties are preferred for long-term storage in simple storage structures because of their resistance to damage by insect pests.
Various improved, high yielding, hybrid varieties are also available. Typically grown from commercially produced seed, they are fertiliser-dependent and require a shorter growing season. However, the husk cover is looser and the grains are softer resulting in high susceptibility to insect pest damage. However, in view of the increased costs and difficulties in obtaining fertiliser for maize production, many small- and medium-scale farmers have experienced a dramatic decline in maize yields. The situation is exacerbated when farmers retain hybrid seed from one season to the next rather than investing in new seed stock.
Many small- and medium-scale producers favour eating traditional maize and regard hybrid varieties as a cash crop which, ideally, is sold immediately after harvest. Some producers retain hybrid maize for consumption, but it has characteristically formed the bulk of the commercially traded maize.
5.5.2 Methods of storage for home consumption
The most common storage structures were the traditional cylindrical crib made of wooden bush poles, and the cylindrical woven basket, made of sticks or bamboo splits and usually raised on a platform. Mud-plastered baskets and bins were also found, although these were typically used for storage of smaller grains such as beans, millet and sorghum, and only occasionally for maize. The cribs and baskets are particularly suited to storage of local maize on the cob. As long as maize is well dried before it is put into the cribs or baskets it will store safely.
A number of improved storage structures were developed by the FCSU at the Mount Makulu Research Station in the 1980s, but uptake of these structures for storage of maize for home consumption has generally been low (see 5.5.5 below).
5.5.3 The attitude of producers to the liberalised market
In the past, it was sensible for farmers to sell maize immediately at harvest time at fixed prices and later, in the lean season, to buy mealie meal at fixed and subsidised rates. With a long experience with guaranteed and fixed prices and a guaranteed market for maize, producers were not prepared for free market trading from 1992. Even after the announcements about new marketing arrangements in 1994, farmers, especially the small-scale producers, are still unaccustomed to negotiating prices in a liberalised market and it is evident that some are being cheated by unscrupulous traders. Interviews with farmers indicate that there is still a widespread belief that the loss of the guaranteed market and fixed prices is only temporary and that government will eventually have to intervene.
The dilemma facing the small- and medium-scale producer with hybrid maize for sale at harvest time is summarised in box 3.
5.5.4 Coping strategies for holding maize surpluses at the farm-level
Within the liberalised marketing system, the producer has to retain stocks until there is a consumer demand. In 1994 MAFF launched an information campaign to advise farmers and traders of the importance of on-farm storage and to encourage adoption of appropriate (improved) storage structures. Although it was acknowledged that the campaign had very limited impact MAFF reported that in 1995/96 and 1996/97 many farmers were holding maize until prices became attractive. Evidence from this mission shows that, at present the majority of producers are reluctantly holding stocks of maize (rather than storing) in the hope that a market may be found.
Maize is retained on the cob in a traditional temporary holding structure or on a platform, and shelled as required. However, towards the end of the dry season there is a fear of fire as it is customary to burn off areas of dry bush and fields before the onset of the rains, and these fires sometimes get out of control. Moreover some farmers report an increased risk of theft of maize cobs from the temporary holding structures. For these reasons, farmers would prefer to shell the cobs as soon as possible and hold the maize in bags but they are often unable to do so because bags are in short supply and/or are too expensive. An exception was seen in Chibombo District where maize for sale is invariably stored in bags which are kept in the house or on concrete slabs specially built for the purpose. As the villages are close to the main Lusaka-Kabwe road there is little difficulty in finding a transporter to carry maize to an urban market or mill.
Storage of hybrid maize through the rainy season in the expectation of obtaining a higher price is still unattractive to many small- and medium-scale producers. Not only is there uncertainty about finding a market and possible difficulties of reaching it given the poor state of rural roads, but also there is a risk of high losses as insect pest attack to stored maize increases during the rainy season.
Box 3 The dilemma facing producers with hybrid maize for sale at harvest
| 1. Reasons for wanting to sell Need for cash to meet household
expenses, school fees etc.
at harvest
2. Reasons for not being able to sell at harvest market
3. Possibility of storing
4. Options in the longer term |
He is unable to store because he has no suitable structure
He cannot afford or obtain insecticide Risk of storage losses Lack of understanding of the liberalised market as he has always sold early
Lack of knowledge of where to sell
apart from
the traditional
Not a traditional practice and selling later
Sell part of the crop at harvest and part
later
|
5.5.5 The appropriateness of improved storage structures
The FCSU has a long history of involvement in the development of improved methods for on-farm storage of maize. Projects funded by the FAO and the European Union (EU) led to the development and introduction of four basic types of improved structure for the storage of shelled maize.
Hybrid varieties, being more susceptible to insect attack, suffer much higher losses and use of insecticide can often be justified. However, this was seen previously as an additional input cost for the farmer who would have been reluctant to treat maize that he expected to sell soon after harvest. The situation has now changed. With maize being held or stored longer, there is even greater justification for using insecticides. However, although storage insecticides appear to be readily available, at least in the main towns, demand among small- and medium-scale producers remains low. Some admit to having used storage insecticides in the past whilst others claim never to have used them. Reasons given for not using insecticides included: expectation of early sales of maize, good storage properties of local varieties, reluctance to add chemicals to maize intended for home consumption, high cost, lack of information about suppliers and non-availability (especially at a local outlet since the demise of the co-operatives).
The following observations on improved storage structures are based on discussions with researchers, extension workers and farmers.
The Ferrumbu reportedly performs well but the high initial outlay for cement and chicken wire puts it beyond the reach of all but a few farmers. A further drawback is the need for a relatively high level of construction skills.
The brick bin also performs well and has been adopted in recent years by assistance programmes and projects in Southern Province as the recommended improved store. A major effort is being made to introduce this structure at the Provincial level through the Southern Province Household Food Security Project (SPHFSP) with a target of 2,000 for 1997, and in Kalomo District through the NGO, World Vision. The bin is being promoted by involving extension workers and farmers in the construction of demonstration units for farmers as a training exercise. Extension workers are expected to encourage and assist others to build their own bins. Invariably some element of subsidy is provided, usually up to 75%, but even so, uptake appears to have been relatively modest. In Kalomo District, where promotion of the structure began last year, only three farmers have built a bin using their own resources, although five more have expressed interest in building bins this year. The SPHFSP is to withdraw the subsidy from 1998 and it remains to be seen what effect this will have on the uptake of the technology. World Vision, on the other hand, has always expected farmers to meet the full cost of constructing a bin but it provides assistance by making cement available on a barter basis (for maize) at rural centres; one bag of cement (value K11,000) is exchanged for one 90kg bag of maize (valued at K7,000 at farm-gate and K15,000 in Lusaka).
Demonstration brick bins were constructed in Kaoma by MAFF during the 1980’s and in Mansa by an NGO about 5 years ago, but again, adoption rate has been poor, No bins were built by farmers in Mansa, probably because the idea was introduced at a time when farmers were beginning to move out of maize and into cassava production.. In Kaoma farmers did not see the need for long term storage given the ready market for maize. District Agricultural Department officials in Kaoma, however, consider that the time is now right to begin to promote improved storage again since some interest has been expressed by farmers, particularly those who are left with quantities of last season’s maize which has now deteriorated.
The cement-plastered basket or bin is said to perform less well due to cracking of the plaster and damage to structural timbers by termites. However, a farmer in Chibombo District is using one of these structures, built as a demonstration unit three years ago and there is no evidence of cracking nor damage by termites. The improved, mud-plastered basket is vulnerable to cracking and attack by termites.
A comparison of the costs of storage in a traditional basket and three improved structures each of 30 bags (x90kg) capacity is given in Table 1. The costs of an improved (mud-plastered) basket are not included in the table but the capital cost can be expected to be similar to that of the traditional basket and the variable costs would be similar to those for the cement-plastered basket. This means that the total annual cost would be K56,200 or K20.81 per kg.
Table 1: Comparison of costs of storage
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| Materials |
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| Labour |
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| Transport |
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| Lifespan |
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| Depreciation1 |
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| Interest2 |
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| Capital Cost per annum |
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| Maintenance/annum |
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| Chemicals |
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| Labour (loading/shelling) |
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| Interest for capital bound in stored produce3 |
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| Estimated value of losses4 |
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| Variable Costs per annum |
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| Total Cost per annum |
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| Total cost per kg stored per annum |
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1Depreciation = Total cost of materials, labour and transport divided by lifespan
2Interest = Real interest = 4%, i.e. nominal rate (34%) - rate of inflation(26%).
3Interest on capital bound in stored produce (including chemicals
and cost of shelling) = savings
interest rate of 16% Produce valued at an average of K10,000 per bag
at harvest time.
4 Maize valued at a replacement cost of K15,000 per bag;
estimated loss in traditional basket store =10%; estimated loss in
cement-plastered basket = 2% (risk
of some residual insect infestation and/or loss to birds.
____________________________________________
The results of this analysis show the benefits of investing in any improved structure and demonstrate the justification for the promotion of the brick bin. For the purposes of this calculation an estimate of 10% has been attributed to the loss due to insects in hybrid maize stored in the traditional basket store. However, a new and devastating pest of stored maize, the Larger Grain Borer (see 5.5.6 below) has recently become established in Zambia, and in areas affected by this pest a more realistic figure for storage loss in the traditional basket would be 25%. This would have the effect of increasing the annual cost of storage in the traditional basket to K45.49 per kg, thus the improved structures become even more attractive financially.
The Larger Grain Borer (LGB), Prostephanus truncatus, a very destructive insect pest of maize and dried cassava was accidentally introduced into Tanzania in East Africa and Togo in West Africa in the early 1980’s. The pest has since spread to neighbouring countries and was reported in Zambia in 1993. In those areas in Africa where LGB is well established, annual storage losses for maize (particularly when stored on the cob) and dried cassava are reported to be double or sometimes treble those caused by the usual range of stored grain pests. Where the pest is uncontrolled farmers have been known to lose their entire stock of stored produce.
In Zambia, LGB was first reported in Nakonde District of Northern Province, close to the border with Tanzania and was probably associated with natural dispersion of the insect and localised cross-border trade in infested maize. The later (1995) spread of LGB to Central, Lusaka, Eastern and Southern Provinces was undoubtedly associated with the importation of maize from Tanzania to off-set the maize shortages resulting from the years of drought. LGB has now been recorded in seven provinces (Northern, Central, Eastern, Copperbelt, Lusaka, Luapula and Southern Provinces) although its distribution is mostly along the line of rail from Nakonde, in the north, to Livingstone, in the south, and along the Nakonde-Mpika road. Records of LGB at sites away from the line of rail/road indicate that the most likely mode of distribution within the country is through trade. Infestations on farms were recorded for the first time last season and heavy losses have occurred in farm-stored maize in some areas of Southern and Northern Province. LGB was also found infesting maize in the field and causing very severe damage and loss during last season in Chirundu area, Siavonga District and in Gwembe District of Southern Province.
As dispersal of LGB is mainly through the movement through trade of infested goods and containers it poses an important threat to regional trade by inhibiting export of maize to countries unaffected by the pest.
A National LGB Containment and Control Programme (NLCCP), co-ordinated by the Plant Protection Department, Mount Makulu, has been established to restrict the rate of spread through maize and cassava trading channels and to address the problem of infestations on farms.
The following interventions have been put in place:
Knowledge of LGB amongst farmers in the districts of LGB-affected Provinces (Kalomo, Chibombo and Mansa) was very sketchy. Most had heard about a new pest of stored maize but few knew how to recognise the damage caused or what insecticides to use. None had received information on LGB from extension staff. There was also a low level of understanding by some extension staff of the seriousness of LGB damage.A public awareness campaign, involving radio and TV broadcasts, a bi-monthly newsletter, newspaper articles, posters and leafletsLegislation empowering Plant Health Inspectors to stop, inspect and search any vehicle which may be suspected of carrying material infested with LGB; and a Code of Practice to ensure that fumigation of infested produce is carried out effectively.
Training and technical awareness workshops for District Agricultural Staff, staff of the Department of Marketing and Trade and NGOs.
Establishment of a national monitoring network for LGB, using pheromone-baited flight traps to provide an early warning of the presence of the pest.
Introduction of a biological control programme in which a predatory beetle (Teretriosoma nigrescens) is being released in LGB-affected and adjacent districts.
Introduction of insecticides suitable for control of LGB
Promotion of improved storage structures
LGB has been detected recently in traps set at the District Agricultural Offices in Chibombo and Mansa, and at the premises of Mansa Milling but no special action has been taken to raise local awareness of the possible threat to stored maize and dried cassava.
Combating the pest requires a major re-examination of on-farm handling and storage methods since early infestation of maize in the field before harvesting can be devastating and maize stored on the cob cannot be adequately protected. The introduction to farmers of the concept of early harvesting, shelling of maize as soon as possible after harvest and treatment of the grain with an appropriate insecticide will require a major extension effort.
It is felt that farmers are more likely to follow the recommendation to shell their maize and to treat it with insecticide if they are offered a low- or no-cost structure for storage of shelled maize. The NLCCP favours the use of the improved mud-plastered basket and the cement-plastered bin. Both structures are being promoted through training programmes based around the construction of demonstration units; no subsidies are provided. In the longer term it is advisable to harmonise advice on improved storage and offer farmers a choice of improved structures including the brick bin and even the ferrumbu.
Maize intended for export must be accompanied by documentary evidence that the commodity has been fumigated. A Code of Conduct for Grain Fumigation has been drafted and individuals and companies undertaking fumigation services are to be licensed and registered to ensure that all treatments are conducted to internationally recognised standards.
It is variously reported that farmers are becoming interested in some form of ‘warehouse’ for communal storage for maize, and that the concept has actively been encouraged. Loans are available to groups of farmers through the Rural Investment Fund (RIF) of ASIP, and some groups of farmers have expressed interest in and/or applied to RIF for assistance in constructing communal stores. It has been suggested that such stores might be built on the hardstandings at the old rural buying centres, which are currently owned by the FRA. Alternatively, groups might consider leasing redundant FRA sheds in rural areas.
The FRA currently ‘owns’ around 700 storage facilities with a total capacity of around 1,800,000 mt. About half of this capacity is in the form of warehouses and sheds and the remainder is hardstandings. Warehouses and sheds of various designs are located at sites throughout the country, particularly along the line of rail. The larger warehouses in a good state of repair and which are surplus to FRA requirements have been rented out but many redundant rural storage facilities remain unused. However, even the smaller of these facilities (500 mt capacity) may be too large for farmer groups unless they are used for storing other commodities in addition to maize.
It is difficult to assess with any degree of accuracy the likely costs of storage in a rented FRA warehouse since the FRA is about to review its rental charges and no figures are available. However, the FRA’s figures for monthly storage costs (which are similar to storage costs of some private warehousing companies) provide an indication of the likely upper limit. The current total monthly cost is K5,672 per mt, thus the storage cost per 90kg bag would be around K510. This would include ‘rent’, charges for handling in and out, pest control, management costs and would take account of variable warehouse occupancy levels.
If the figure of K510 per bag per month is taken as the storage charge that a farmer would pay for using a communal warehouse then the annual costs of storage, assuming that maize is stored for six months to take advantage of a seasonal price rise, will be K3,060 per bag (or K34 per kg) Thus the cost is higher than for an improved on-farm structure even before the additional costs of bags, transport to store and interest on capital bound up in stored produce is taken into account.
It must be emphasised that this is purely an example of the possible charges that farmers may face in using a communal store. Costs will vary depending on the actual rent levied by FRA and the level of service provided (handling, pest control, store management) and on personnel employed to operate the warehouse on behalf of the group. It will be essential for groups contemplating communal storage to seek expert advice on the financial and management implications.
It should be noted that, communal storage groups do not have an outstanding record of performance in Africa. Groups need a careful explanation of the principles of communal storage, including guidance on management of grain quality. The admixture of insecticide with maize before bagging would be imperative - a major problem facing many communal storage groups has been the high losses caused to stored grain by insects. Other difficulties with communal storage groups have been those of conflicting priorities among members, and difficulties in defining and maintaining strict management procedures. Farmers interviewed in Kalomo confirmed that the formation of associations or groups to take advantage of communal storage might be a way forward but admitted that from previous experience cohesion of groups was poor and the high risk that people would lose interest and drop out may jeopardise such a scheme.
There is also a danger that if groups are formed in response to offers of concessional resources through the RIF, they will attract members primarily interested in short-term gains rather than the benefits of long-term co-operation. Communal storage may also create an unnecessary link in the marketing chain. A better approach might be for groups to co-operate in bulking up produce and finding buyers willing to purchase full truck-loads but again, success of the scheme would depend on good cohesion of the group. If people dropped out and the trader was unable to collect an ‘economic’ load the scheme may fail. It would be more appropriate for traders to use redundant FRA facilities in rural areas as collection depots (and perhaps, as distribution points for inputs) which are open to all.
Commercial farmers tend to deal mainly with secondary level traders including international companies, the large mills and other processors, such as breweries and feed mills. Small-scale farmers usually sell to primary level traders who either sell on through public markets or to secondary level traders, upon whose behalf they often act as agents. Often primary level traders are farmers themselves who augment their own supplies with produce purchased from others.
The mission confirmed findings of earlier studies by MAFF and FAO that there is a general lack of knowledge among small- and medium-scale farmers regarding the operation of the liberalised market and how to access and interpret marketing information. The dilemma facing farmers has been discussed above (5.5.3) and the need to improve the information flow to farmers is discussed later.
Producers in all districts indicated that they faced problems in marketing their maize. In the short term, their response to the liberalised market has been to sell or barter maize with neighbours or itinerant traders. A minority of farmers have established links with traders (some of whom also supply inputs) and are thus more assured of a market for their produce.
Prior to liberalisation no farmer would have been more than about 5km from a government buying centre, and transporting maize over these short distances presented no major problems. Traders and transporters are unwilling to travel to remote rural areas where road infrastructure is poor particularly if they are not assured of collecting a full load. Many producers are only now beginning to realise that they can no longer rely on someone coming to buy their produce and that they must actively seek out markets and if necessary transport their produce either to a collection point at a main road or to a market centre.
Small quantities of produce destined for local markets nearby may be carried by head-load or bicycle but for larger quantities and for longer distances ox-carts, hired transport or a combination of both may be used. Ox-carts may be used over moderate distances to a point where produce can conveniently be transferred to other transport (pick-up, truck, mini-bus etc.) or to a point on the main road where the farmer can wait for a passing bus or truck. It was reported in Kalomo District that ox-carts are used to transport maize over distances of around 30km. It is clear, therefore, that a considerable amount of time that would otherwise have been devoted to on-farm or homestead activities is now spent in getting produce to market.
Farmers may be reluctant to take maize to market because of the cost of transport relative to the expected sale price, especially early in the season when maize prices are low. There is considerable variation in the cost of transport across the country. In Kaoma, for example, the average cost of transporting one 90kg bag of maize was K1,500 and the one-way passenger fare was K2,500. In the two or three months after harvest the market price of maize was between K8,000 and K10,000 although the price was expected to rise to around K20,000 by October. In Kalomo, transport costs for a similar distance were lower; the charge for one 90kg bag of maize was K1,200 and the passenger fare was K1,250. Market prices were correspondingly lower; K6,000- K7,000 after harvest, with an anticipated rise to K15,000 by October.
The idea of farmers associating with neighbours to provide a simple self-help system was raised with some groups and was generally met with enthusiasm. By pooling the bags of maize they each have for sale they might collectively find a trader or transporter more willing to arrange collection of their maize. The idea of forming such self-help groups generally seems to be alien to many farmers although rural associations, in the past, have been crucial to agricultural development. Producers were members of primary co-operative societies, through which arrangements were made for input supply and marketing. After withdrawal of government financial support for co-operatives the primary societies collapsed.
The strong support given to the co-operative sector tended to suppress the development of other forms of spontaneous associations with the exception perhaps of women’s clubs. Women, being traditionally excluded from the marketing sector, generally did not participate in the co-operative movement and began to form groups to respond to their specific needs. These groups are, at present, the only rural associations with an impact on the rural economy. Interestingly, where women’s groups have demonstrated a certain success, men are now showing interest in the way the associations are running and male farmer groups are beginning to emerge.
The majority of villages in rural areas are served by an inadequate and poorly maintained road network. The poor condition of roads which are often impassable during the rainy season is a major constraint to the efficient marketing of produce. In some areas the problem is being addressed by newly established road rehabilitation programmes, often sponsored by NGOs. This move to improve access to markets and to improve communication with rural areas generally is to be welcomed. However, to ensure a lasting impact the rehabilitation programme must be followed by a programme of routine maintenance otherwise the new roads will soon deteriorate. This issue does not appear to be have been given sufficient consideration and responsibilities for maintenance programmes have not been clearly defined.
Undoubtedly some farmers face difficulties in marketing their maize but there is evidence that the informal sector of marketing (and input supply) is beginning to flourish in some areas. The pattern of business tends to be one of rapid turnover of stocks, mainly supplying identified markets, so as to avoid all interest, storage and double handling costs. Trading tends to focus on transporting maize from accessible areas of surplus production to identified markets. For example, in Kalomo, traders have come together as a group and are sharing resources including labour to load trucks, and they now have the capacity to obtain informal credit and to organise transport to main maize trade outlets in Lusaka and Livingstone. As a group, they also arrange collection of maize from rural areas, buying up to 30 bags during each of the 2-3 trips per month. Consequently, they represent a significant outlet for some of the poorer producers and they strongly refute claims by farmers that there is no market for maize.
The same group of traders also sell empty grain bags and fertilisers at the market centre and sometimes carry stocks to the rural areas on their buying trips. Other traders and input-suppliers have established links with individual farmers and are operating a form of outgrower scheme. Fertiliser and seed is made available to farmers either for cash or in exchange for maize (although a few traders offer credit) and the trader guarantees to buy the maize soon after harvest. Such traders may have their own storage facilities ranging from simple store-rooms to proper warehouses, and are thus able to engage in speculative storage.
Small-scale wholesalers on the other hand tend to have simple store rooms although many emerging wholesalers have only crude shelters or keep stocks under tarpaulin sheets. The shortage of finance coupled with the uncertainty about the future state of the market dissuades them from investing in permanent storage. Thus, wholesale grain trading centres in towns as focal points are rudimentary and need to be encouraged to develop and consolidate.
Since liberalisation, the marketing system for durable agricultural commodities, especially maize, has felt the impact of international grain trading companies. These companies work through, or in partnership with, local companies and the entry of the international companies has enhanced the country’s ability to weather the transition to a liberalised system, avoiding collapse of the market. Some transport companies have been adding maize trading to their activities and, to achieve a better trading performance, they have invested in their own warehousing operations. There is no shortage of warehouse capacity in Zambia and many traders are leasing surplus warehouses and covered hardstandings for storage of maize (and other commodities) from the Food Reserve Agency.
Some companies trading in agricultural inputs rent warehouses and rural sheds from FRA. Fertiliser is offered at rural centres for cash or in exchange for maize. When sufficient bartered maize has been accumulated at the rural centre it is collected by truck and transported to the company’s main warehouse (or direct to market). As reported above, a large number of rural sheds currently owned by the FRA remain empty and there would seem to be an opportunity for other traders to rent them as collection sites for bulking up maize from local farmers. However, for many this is an unattractive proposition because of their remoteness or because of poor road infrastructure.
Processing of maize is a task performed almost exclusively by women. Small quantities of maize may be hand-pounded using a pestle and mortar or processed using a hand grinder. Hand grinders with capacities ranging from 7kg to 30kg are quite common. Even though the operation of the grinder is regarded as laborious women show considerable interest in owning one especially for preparation of small quantities of meal. A disadvantage is that after grinding, the meal has to be winnowed or sieved and this can be time consuming. Overall, it was considered that access to a hammermill was the preferred option to hand-processing.
5.7.2 Village level and peri-urban processing
Significant changes have occurred in the maize milling industry following the removal of subsidies. There has been an increase in the number of small hammermills, especially in rural areas, coupled with a decline in the throughput from large, urban commercial mills. A census in 1994 indicated that the number of hammermills was around 6,000 (there has been no update to this census figure). It was estimated that hammermills accounted for virtually all of the maize milled in rural areas (and as much as 60% to 70% of the maize milled in urban areas). The introduction of hammermills at the rural level reduces the drudgery of hand-pounding of maize. The emerging small-scale hammermilling sector is succeeding mainly because of a cost advantage to producers, but quality of meal and convenience are also important factors.
All hammermills produce roller meal (whole grain meal) and some hammermills are able to produce a breakfast meal where the grain is dehulled before grinding. All hammermills provide service milling for customers who bring relatively small amounts of produce to be milled. Some hammermills have extended into commercial milling and now provide a meal which is sold to the public or to institutions. Commercial milling is a response to the need to increase the utilisation of the mill. Some commercial mills process maize produced on the owner’s farm or purchased maize, while others also make maize available for sale at the mill. This overcomes the suspicions that some consumers are said to have about pre-packaged meal. Commercial mills can therefore provide farmers with an alternative market for their maize and it has been suggested that commercial hammermills can stimulate retention of maize at the farm or village level. However, although purchase and short-term storage of maize by hammermills may be possible in peri-urban and urban locations but it was not found in any of the rural areas of the districts visited.
The distribution of hammermills is concentrated mainly in the more accessible areas. They usually serve households within a radius of 3-5 km but some are known to serve households up to 10km distant. In Chibombo District the number of mills has increased to the extent that competition is so severe that it is difficult to see how all can survive.
Women are the main customers of hammer mills bringing relatively small quantities of maize for milling. Although milling may take only a few minutes the mills are now so popular that customers may have to wait several hours to have their maize milled. Many tend to leave maize at the mill and make another trip to the to collect the meal either later the same day or on the following day.
Hammermills are said to offer several advantages: the pounding work carried out by women is, at least partially eliminated; meal is produced cheaper and more hygienically; the bran by-product is retained for animal feed in the village; there is increased social contact at the mill and the time saved by women may be utilised for other activities. However, access to a hammer mill may not always result in a saving of time for women. In Kalomo District women complained that the amount of time spent in taking maize to the mill had increased. Not only do they have to wait longer now that the popularity of the mill has increased (the nearest alternative mill being 20km away) but they also have to make more visits to the mill per week. Previously, relatively large quantities of maize could be taken to the mill by ox-cart but since the cattle population has been decimated by two recent outbreaks of corridor disease there are either no oxen or only weak animals to draw the carts. As a consequence, maize has to be carried by head-load and in much smaller quantities. A further negative consequence of hammer milling for women is that they are usually expected to meet the extra expense of the maize grinding charges from their own income generating activities.
It is reported that rural hammermills are often out of operation for long periods. In Kaoma for example, it was confirmed that of the 100 or so mills in the district only about 50% are working at any particular time. In Kalomo and Chibombo it was estimated that between 20% and 25% would be non-operational at any one time. No figures were available for Mansa. The mills may be out of operation because of breakdowns, shortage of spare parts and lack of technical repair skills. In the more remote areas, especially in Kaoma District, erratic or unreliable supplies of diesel result in frequent stoppages.
Some hammermill operators in Kalomo District have benefited from training courses organised by the Zambia Agricultural Management Services project (ZAMS) between 1990 and 1995 which enhanced their capability for routine and preventative maintenance.
Most hammer mills are owned and operated by men although
a few women’s clubs have invested in hammer mills as an income generating
activity. However, it is difficult to see how some of these businesses
will survive. The standard of technical, business and financial management
is low, perhaps reflecting the difficulties that women face in accessing
advice and support. One club had not been able to repay the loan (provided
by an NGO) to establish the enterprise within the two years agreed and
is still 50% behind in the total repayment and machinery in two other mills
were in poor condition due to irregular maintenance.