4.1. Comparative analysis of the post-harvest system of potato and sweet potato
4.2. Analysis of gender participation in post-harvest systems
4.1.1. Production characteristics
4.1.2. Demand characteristics
4.1.3. Post-harvest chains
4.1.4. Efficiency of the post-harvest system
4.1.5. Labour requirement and value added at the farm and at the different stages of the post-harvest system
4.1.6. Institutions involved in the potato and sweet potato post-harvest systems
4.1.7. Stability of the system
4.1.8. Constraints in the post-harvest system
Kenya's development objectives for the agricultural sector include internal self-sufficiency in basic foods according to the comparative advantage in the production of crops (GOK 1994). Increased production is needed to cope with population growth. Since a considerable part of the population growth takes place in urban areas, effective and efficient post-harvest systems are required. Potential major constraints might place a high burden on economic and social development, thus restraining economic growth.
Potato and sweet potato post-harvest systems are especially vulnerable to be hit by constraint factors because of their bulkiness and perishability. Potatoes store well, but sweet potato has a shelf-life of little more than one week after harvesting. There is a constant supply of potato and sweet potato throughout the year. The actors in the post-harvest system therefore are continuously receiving market signals down the chain.
There is a strong all-year round demand for potato in the domestic, restaurant and institutional sector. Although potato is usually associated with middle class consumption patterns in developing countries, in Kenya it is also an integral part of the diet of those living in the central area - mainly Kikuyu. As average real incomes rise, it can be expected that the demand will become stronger.
Sweet potato, on the other hand is seen as an inferior food. In the traditional cook-book it is considered limited, and more of a snack than a proper staple. Sweet potato carries a "stigma" of being a food of last resort, or famine food.
An improvement in marketing conditions for sweet potato has been found in one of the study sites. Whether the supply response was due to an increase in overall demand fostered by the increasing price of maize and bread - or due to the more efficient marketing system, could not be determined in the course of this study. A major factor of the future development of sweet potato as a cash crop is the uptake of urban consumers as a basic staple food. The following factors are likely to affect further demand:
· demographic changes due to population growth will lead to an intensification of production,· increasing urbanisation, accompanied by stagnating incomes will lead to the substitution of maize by sweet potato, because sweet potato provides cheap calories,
· the uptake of urban processing for sweet potato flour and the incorporation of the flour in traditional and new snacks.
The question remains, who are the consumers? The urban poor, who can no longer afford the more expensive items, and will switch away from sweet potato if the price of maize and other expensive food should fall? Or, is it the population originating from the western part of the country and residing in the cities, for whom sweet potato is a familiar, if not regular part of the diet, and who are buying it because market liberalisation has brought more things onto the market?
Available historical data on prices and production of the major food crops in Kenya were brought together by the Policy Analysis Matrix team of Egerton University in order to determine the substitutive relationship between production and demand of food commodities in the long run.4
Figure 4: Variation in productive area of major crops in Kenya, 1991 to 1995 (based on average 91 to 95)
Source: MOALD, Kenya
Figure 4 shows the variation in productive area for the major food crops: maize, cassava, sweet potato and potato between 1991 and 1995. As a consequence of maize being the major food crop, small variations in production appear dramatic compared to the production of other crops. It seems that potato and sweet potato production move in the opposite direction to that of maize production.
It can be supposed that as maize prices fall, farmers substitute with short term root crops - potato and sweet potato, expanding the area of these short term crops to the detriment of maize production. Similarly when maize prices rise, farmers plant more maize reducing the area of potato and sweet potato. It might be that cassava also substitutes, but because of the long lag period between planting and harvest it is not so apparent on the limited data.
Figure 5 shows the monthly prices of the same crops over a three year period: 1994 to 1996. It is apparent that the prices of potato and sweet potato fluctuate much more than the price of maize. In late 1994, the price of maize fell after a bumper maize harvest. Prices of potato and sweet potato, on the other hand went up, as production fell. This suggests, that although sweet potato may to some extent substitute maize, there is a fairly inelastic core demand for the product. The demand for potato is relatively inelastic because of the constant demand from the hotel and catering trade for chips, and so prices are much more supply driven.
Figure 5: Prices of major crops in Kenya, 1994 to 1996
Source: Data compiled by Egerton University
Potato is a much more commercialised crop, both from a production and marketing point of view. The major part of the crop is grown for sale. In contrast, sweet potato has traditionally been grown on small plots for domestic consumption. Production for the market is a recent development. In Kisii it was started in 1992, and only a few areas have really benefited from the market development. The main stimulus to production for the market was the presence of traders who were regularly going to the large urban markets. This coincided with poor prices and late payment for coffee crop - a major cash crop in the district. Farmers were therefore looking for alternative crops to raise cash from. Finally, in 1994, a bumper maize harvest in Kenya severely depressed maize prices, thus making sweet potato appear a more attractive cash crop.
Potato has a well developed market chain from producers to the wholesale market. The bulk of potato marketing is done on a regularly scheduled system. Agents or brokers in the villages act for traders by organising farmers to assemble their crop ready graded and packed for collection, to fulfil orders made by traders. The lorry then delivers the crop direct to Nairobi market. Some consumers, notably chip manufacturers, have developed direct links to some farms to ensure a regular supply and an assured standard. Such contracts represent a very small proportion of the business.
For sweet potato a similar system has developed in Kisii in the most commercialised areas, except here crop is usually transhipped in Kisii town from a pick-up to an inter-city lorry. This is because the traders are smaller operators and usually do not buy sufficient quantities to fill a lorry on their own. In the less developed system, agents buy from farmers and deliver by donkey to the tarmac, where traders buy prearranged volumes at prearranged times. The trader then flags down a passing truck to carry to Ahero or Kisii for transhipment to inter-city transports plying between the main towns.
Table 15 shows the percentage margins received by the different actors in the chain. Potato farmers in Meru receive 69% of the wholesale price both in the local and the Nairobi market, for their product, indicating a high degree of competition and low freight rates. Sweet potato farmers receive 55% on the Nairobi market.
The trader's margin for potato varies considerably, with the highest margins going to the local Meru trader. Those trading from Meru to Nairobi seems to make the thinnest margin. This reflects higher costs due to repacking, but also may reflect a higher price to the farmer due to the enforcement of a more uniform standard of bag.
The margins shown in table 15 are related to the wholesale price. Additional work is needed to relate the margins to the retail price.
Table 15a: Marketing margins for Potato
|
|
Kibirichia |
Kibirichia |
Kinangop |
|
|
MERU |
NAIROBI |
NAIROBI |
||
|
Variety |
Ngure |
Kerr's Pink |
Tana |
|
|
Wholesale price (Ksh/bag) |
1,300 |
1,800 |
1,800 |
|
|
Margin as % of wholesale price: |
||||
|
|
Farmer |
69% |
69% |
67% |
|
|
Rural broker |
0% |
4% |
3% |
|
|
Transport costs: |
5% |
8% |
8% |
|
|
Handling & packaging |
3% |
6% |
3% |
|
|
To local govt |
2% |
2% |
2% |
|
|
Trader: |
|
|
|
|
|
Overhead |
0% |
1 % |
1% |
|
|
Trader profit |
70% |
11 % |
17% |
Source: Derived from table 6
Table 15b: Marketing margins for Sweet potato
|
Nyanza/Kisii area |
NAKURU |
NAIROBI |
MOMBASA |
|
|
Error! Bookmark not |
1,100 |
1,200 |
1,600 |
|
|
Margin as % of wholesale price: |
||||
|
|
Farmer |
55% |
54% |
38% |
|
|
Rural broker |
0% |
4% |
9% |
|
|
Transport costs: |
21% |
20% |
24% |
|
|
Handling & packaging |
7% |
6% |
7% |
|
|
To local govt |
2% |
2% |
1% |
|
|
Trader: |
|||
|
|
Overhead |
2% |
3% |
5% |
|
|
Trader profit |
14% |
10% |
16% |
Source: Derived from table 12
Effectiveness in meeting demand patterns
The effectiveness in bridging supply and demand for the crop with special regard to the geographical distance between production and consumption, to seasonality and product quality is good in both systems. Potato production has responded to strong urban demand and is a major traded commodity. Steady demand increases due to a shift in urban consumption patterns have led to a constant development of supply chains from the major production regions. In sweet potato marketing, restricted urban demand is guiding the development of the post-harvest system. Commercialisation has reached only part of its potential.
Food security
The population of Kenya increased from 22 million in 1988 to 29.2 million in 1996, an increase of 3.9 % per year. Over the same period the GNP per capita fell from US$ 410 to just US$ 260 per head - a real decline of more than 5 % per year. Figure 6 overleaf plots changes in the production of major crops from the year 1985/86 up to 1995/96 with changes in population and GNP per capita. Production figures for the major crops in the 90s has been falling. The consumer price index (CPI) for food has risen faster than the general CPI. This is an alarming picture. By the year 2010, the population is expected to reach 44 million and by the year 2025, sixty-three million.
Maize is Kenya's staple crop, providing three-quarters of the carbohydrates for Kenya's fast growing population. The demand for maize is relatively inelastic, and shortage of maize results in large price increases. Maize production has spread to the margins in Kenya, and production suffers badly at times of drought. Sweet potato and Cassava are relatively more drought resistant.
Sweet potato can play an important role in food security strategy for Kenya:
· It is considered more nutritious than cassava.· It is more drought resistant than maize.
· It can improve the yield of maize in a crop rotation compared to continuous maize production. Further, continuous maize cropping on the same field leads to reduced yields. As noted by some farmers in Kisii rotating sweet potato crop with maize improves the maize yield. Increased production of sweet potato could therefore improve farmers incomes through higher yields of maize, as well as income from sweet potato.
· Finally, sweet potato is a relatively short term crop, with a flexible time of harvest allowing a high degree of flexibility in a food security strategy.
Figure 6: Changes in production, population and income in Kenya (base year = 1987/88).
Figure 7: Wholesale prices for sweet potato in different markets in Kenya 1996
Source: Market Information Bureau of Ministry of Agriculture
Barriers to entry
Given the number of agents, traders, porters and brokers involved in the system, there appear to be no serious barriers to entry. Obviously those with capital can acquire larger consignments and reduce their overheads. Those with vehicles running efficiently can increase their margins.
No serious efforts have been made to set up co-operatives to compete with the private trader and recoup some of the trading margins for the farmer.
Transport costs
Transport charges are competitive on the inter-city routes because the vehicles will generally get a return cargo. Table 18 shows the rates charged by a small cantor operating from Kisii. With a guaranteed return cargo, a profit of over 50 % per trip can be expected. The rental for a one-way journey would be 12,000 KSh producing an "operating profit" (not including fixed costs) of 27 %.
Table 16: Analysis of transport costs for one 3.3 tons Cantor truck
|
|
Assumptions |
|
|
|
Rated load capacity: |
3.3 tons |
||
|
Actual weight carried: |
5 tons |
||
|
Number of bags usually earned |
45 bags |
||
|
No of trips |
|
||
|
per week |
3 |
||
|
per year |
150 |
||
|
Cost per bag |
170 KSh per bag |
||
|
Hire charge per trip |
7,650 KSh |
||
|
COSTS AND |
|||
|
|
cost |
no x yr |
total annual cost |
|
Annual fixed cost |
|
|
|
|
Depreciation cost (10 yrs) |
700,000 |
0.10 |
70,000 |
|
Insurance |
15,000 |
1 |
15,000 |
|
Tax |
3,000 |
1 |
3,000 |
|
Driver |
5,000 |
12 mth |
60,000 |
|
Conductor |
3,000 |
12 mth |
36,000 |
|
|
|
|
184,000 |
|
|
COST PER TRIP: |
|
1,227 |
|
|
NO RETURN CARGO |
RETURN CARGO |
|
|
Variable cost |
to and fro |
one way |
|
|
Fuel |
5,200 |
2,600 |
|
|
Oil |
770 |
385 |
|
|
Maintenance |
2,500 |
1,250 |
|
|
Overnight allowance |
1,000 |
500 |
|
|
|
9,470 |
4,735 |
|
|
Fixed cost per trip |
1,227 |
613 |
|
|
TOTAL COST PER TRIP |
10,697 |
5,348 |
|
|
HIRE CHARGE PER TRIP |
7,650 |
7,650 |
|
|
PROFIT PER TRIP |
-3,047 |
2,302 |
|
|
as percentage of cost: |
-28% |
48% |
|
Source: Based on information given by a lorry owner in Kisii, and interview in Kinangop
Loading costs
Loading is done by organised groups of workers in all market locations, and payment is usually made to the organiser. The rates therefore tend to be standard. Loading is usually 15 to 20 KSh per bag, and unloading costs 10 KSh. This might be one reason why traders prefer to carry large bags. In fact, smaller bags can be loaded at a lower price, after negotiation.
Transaction costs
A post-harvest system is allocatively efficient if it is able to minimise the transaction costs from production to final destination. No exploitative tendency could be found. Calculations show that in the potato post-harvest system more added-value is gained by actors belonging to the rural areas compared to urban actors, than in the sweet potato system.
In both marketing systems, there are many agents and traders serving the farmer. It appears that prices to the farmer are uniform within a village, and agents/traders compete on service. Traders pay agents fixed commissions, but may top up in times of shortage.
Social efficiency
The post-harvest system of both crops involves many actors and creates "semi" and "casual" employment for large parts of the poorer sections of the population. It also provides a training ground in entrepeneurship to persons who may want to start another enterprise or expand up the marketing ladder. Little initial capital and skills are required to take part in the system.
The post-harvest system of root and tuber crops contributes significantly to employment in rural and urban areas. A comparison of pre- and post-harvest labour input shows that more labour is required in the post-harvest chain than in production (see table 19). The model calculation based on crop budget data from Meru and survey data from marketing to Nairobi yields a ratio of 1.9 of post- to pre-harvest labour input.
Table 17: Labour input in potato pre- and post-harvest operations (model calculation)
|
Operation |
Labour input (mandays/bag) |
Comment | |
|
Pre-Harvest | |||
|
|
Production (farm family labour) |
1 |
Each 20 days for sowing, fertilisation/spraying and weeding. |
|
|
Harvesting & grading (casual labour) |
0.7 |
Harvesting 2.5 bags/day, grading 3.5 bags/day |
|
|
TOTAL |
1.7 |
|
|
Post-Harvest | |||
|
|
Rural assembling |
0.1 |
10 bags/day |
|
|
Transporting |
0.05 |
45 bags/day, 3 day per week |
|
|
Wholesaling |
0.04 |
25 bags/day |
|
|
Market agent1 |
0.05 |
10 bags/day |
|
|
Processing² |
1 |
0.5 bag/day |
|
|
Retailing to consumers |
2 |
0.5 bag/day |
|
|
TOTAL |
3.24 |
|
|
Ratio (Post-Harvest to Pre-Harvest) |
1.9 |
| |
1 An estimated 50 % of the total amount is marketed by brokers/agents.
2 An estimated 50 % of the total amount is processed to chips and crisps.
Source: Derived from tables 5 and 7 as well as interviews at Wakulima market
Assuming perfect competition in labour markets and nearly equal qualification, returns to labour should be the same in production and post-harvest. As table 20 indicates, the value-added in the potato post-harvest chain is slightly higher than farmers' profit per unit. Returns to labour are 285 KSh/bag in production (only for farm family labour) and 305 KSh/bag in post-harvest operation. However, returns on land are not accounted for in the figure of production costs.
Table 18: Value-added and return to labour in pre- and post-harvest operations of potato
|
Production: |
||
|
|
Profit per acre: |
KSh 17,100 |
|
|
Profit per bag: |
KSh 285 |
|
|
Profit per manday (return to farm family labour and land) |
KSh 285 |
|
Post-harvest: |
||
|
|
Value-added per bag in the chain (between farm gate and retailing to consumers) |
KSh 1600 |
|
|
Value-added per manday (3.24 mandays/bag) |
KSh 305 |
Source: derived from tables 5 and 7
The operations in the potato and sweet potato post-harvest chains are almost solely executed by private sector agents. On the national level these two crops have not yet been considered as priority crops in the government research and extension system compared to other crops such as maize and wheat. Only to a limited extent public institutions have supported research and extension on potatoes and sweet potatoes. However, there are recent examples where local public entities have intervened in the marketing system.
Research and extension
Public research on both crops has been carried out by the Kenyan Agricultural Research Institute (KARI), partly in cooperation with the International Potato Center (CIP). Research on post-harvest problems focussed on technical issues such as flour processing (Kabira and Imungi, 1991; Kabira 1992) and post-harvest protection. However, links to extension are weak.
Recently, the potato sub-sector faced the break-down of certified seed production. KARI and other para-statal organisations were supposed to supply certified seed to farmers, but in fact did not effectively reach them. The private sector is not in the position to fill this gap. This leads to a deterioration of the seed quality. In Meru, farmers complained about lacking high-quality seed potatoes thus causing a breakdown of disease resistance and low yields. KARI-Tigoni is just starting a NGO-sponsored project which aims at informal seed distribution among farmers at the local level.5
Extension activities in sweet potato production were rare mainly because sweet potato for a long time has been considered a subsistence crop, which is hardly marketable. For this reason an extensionist recommended to farmers not to spend money on inputs for sweet potato production, but to dedicate them to marketable crops. The very few efforts made in sweet potato extension addressed on-farm processing in rural women groups. Those are still working, but to date the quantities processed are negligible.
Public involvement in the marketing system in Meru district
In 1995 the Meru District Agricultural Committee (DAC) decided to intervene in potato trade. Until that date extended hags were used in potato marketing, which was unsatisfactory for most farmers because the size of the extension was difficult to standardise. After numerous discussions within the DAC, it was decided to introduce flat bags in Meru district. Table 19 gives an overview of the DAC:
Table 19: Composition of the District Agricultural Committee in Meru District
|
Chairman: District Commissioner |
|
Secretary: District Agricultural Officer (DAO) |
|
- Division Agricultural Officers (one per division) |
|
- Farmer representatives (one per division) |
|
- County Council representatives |
|
- Members of Parliament from the district (occasional) |
Source: personal communication, DAC, Meru
Remarkably the decision in favour of flat bags was not implemented through a formal law, but through the collaboration of various groups of the society. At the farm and in the villages the chiefs and the members of youth clubs made sure that only flat bags were used when packing at the farms, outside the villages the trucks were checked by officials. When extended bags were found they had to be repacked on the spot.
Meru can be an example for other potato producing areas where the same problems are common. If more District Agricultural Committees support the flat hag standard would be enforced by public-private sector partnership on a national scale.
Potato and sweet potato post-harvest systems are run by the private sector
In conclusion it has to be emphasised that the private sector agents dominate both the potato and the sweet potato post-harvest systems.
In the potato sector a well established system of farmers, traders, processors and consumers is found. Key operators such as farmers, traders, transporters, processors and retailers work closely with each other. In general there are no fixed contractual relations between a specific farmer and a specific trader or processor. Business partners change frequently depending on supply and demand. As many farmers and many traders are involved there are few prospects for cartels.
The transaction costs at each stage of the post-harvest-system are reasonable. This is mainly due to the involvement of so-called "agents" who link business partners. In the rural areas they bring together farmers and traders, in the urban markets they are the link between the wholesale markets and processors (hotels, restaurants, crisps industries, etc.).
The sweet potato post-harvest system basically relies on the same operators. However, as the marketing of sweet potato has started recently, the post-harvest operations take place at a much smaller scale.
There is a difference in the type and number of operations and actors in the PH system between a highly commercialised crop (potato) and a crop in the initial stage of commercialisation (sweet potato). The structure of the marketing of potato shows more direct links between the farmer and different market actors. From the farmers' point of view the market is therefore well developed. Co-operative marketing has not been established.
The diversity of acting agents and middlemen involved in potato marketing is considerably high. There is effective competition among actors at the different levels. From the farmers point of view, there are usually several marketing options including storage at the farm. The system is therefore relatively robust to external shocks. Although farmers were not so much aware of potato prices in distant urban markets, information about the price level at local markets is efficient. Farmers know that supply shortages in substitutive commodities like maize boost potato prices.
The sweet potato post-harvest system is still in the stage of limited commercialisation. The post-harvest chain is mainly operating through a few bottlenecks which are the assembling and transhipment points in Kisii and Ahero.
Potential constraints of the sub-sector have been collected by the survey team in a two-stage approach:
1. an expert meeting during the preparatory phase with participation of representatives from MoALDM, KARI, universities, CIP, GTZ and NGOs2. review of previous studies and reports as well as interviews with key informants
Constraints in the post-harvest system can be either
· technological, e.g. the lack of technologies for certain post-harvest operations, or· financial and economic, e.g. for certain required operations or inputs the incurred costs are too high, or
· institutional, e.g. lack of infrastructure and barriers for contractual arrangements.
Most of the constraint hypotheses suggested in the expert meeting relate to the institutional level which led to the assumption that there might be major imperfections in the post-harvest systems of both crops. The constraint hypotheses were guiding the selection of interview partners and study sites, as well as the analysis of survey findings.
The assessment of constraints is strongly related to the performance of the post-harvest system. The performance of systems is usually measured by its productivity, efficiency, the flexibility to survive and the ability to absorb external shocks.
The analysis of the survey data found less constraints in the system than expected (see annex 3a and 3b). The post-harvest system is generally able to cope with the specific characteristics of root and tuber crops. The transport system is coping with the bulkiness of both commodities by establishing various lines of transport according to their relative costs. Perishability of the sweet potato is a potential hazard. Although handling is generally rough, the quality of the product offered to final destinations is not affected. Losses are generally seen as negligible.
However, major areas could be identified in which the systems' performance is hampered:
· The state of the rural road infrastructure is increasing transport costs. In the Meru and Nyandarua districts, many roads are poor during rainy periods. In the Kisii and Rachuonyo districts, feeder roads are inaccessible and thus unable to provide access from distant production areas to the main roads, especially during the rains.· Transparency on the volume traded in the market is low. Packaging is not standardised, which leads to faulty information for actors who are not familiar with marketing. Furthermore, farmers are unable to interpret prices expressed in bags of unknown weight or volume.
· Potato supply is constrained by the lack of certified seed.
· Traditional eating habits hamper the further commercialisation of sweet potato.
· Research-extension linkages to and from the farmer are weak, especially for sweet potato.
On the technical level, operations like harvesting, grading and storage only require little improvement. On-farm processing of sweet potato for commercial purposes is still in its initial stage and lacks economic attractiveness.
Lack of credit did not appear a major problem for many actors. Although individuals claim the need for it, systematic access barriers to capital could not be found. Entry barriers to markets and operations exist, but are not leading to excessive margins and profits. A high degree of trust among wholesale market actors was observed, thus indicating the performance of informal contractual arrangements.
Systems analysis has been proven as a suitable tool for assessing the performance and identifying constraints for further development. The performance of the post-harvest system of the two crops is quite good. No major inefficiencies at the present stage were observed.
The development perspectives of the two systems are different and depend on various factors. Potato as an already highly commercialised crop has entered the diet of both urban and rural consumers in many areas of Kenya. Commercialisation and supply have steadily developed to a system that shows enough flexibility and diversity to secure a constant supply to market demand.
The capacity of the existing sweet potato post-harvest system is strongly interrelated to the current demand pattern. Urban and rural town demand drives the development. Interventions that aim for an increase in production areas in order to stimulate commercialisation should therefore not be made without prior analysis of market demand development.
Potato
Potato growing and marketing within the main growing areas is highly commercialised As such it cannot be described as a women's or a man's crop, but a family affair. In the more intensive farming systems such as found in Meru, all family members participate in most of the farm activities and occasionally hire labour when needed. In the Meru area, there was no clear distinction between gender roles in the production of potatoes. In the local markets, there were more women wholesaling and retailing potatoes than men. At the farm level, men and women were active in production, harvesting, sorting and selling. Table 20 compares the gender differences in various activities related to post-harvest operations of the potato.
Table 20: Division of labour in potato production and post-harvest operations
|
Operation |
Family labour |
Hired labour |
||
|
women |
men |
women |
men |
|
|
planting |
x |
x |
x |
x |
|
spraying |
|
xx |
|
xx |
|
weeding |
x |
x |
x |
x |
|
harvesting |
x |
x |
xx |
|
|
sorting |
x |
x |
x |
x |
|
marketing at farm level |
x |
x |
|
|
|
packaging |
|
x |
|
x |
|
selling at local market |
xxx |
x |
|
|
|
selling at major markets |
|
x (trader) |
|
|
|
retailing |
xxx |
x |
|
|
|
processing |
|
xx (processor) |
x |
xx |
Key: x = low, xx = medium, xxx = high intensity of involvementSource: authors' compilation
In the marketing chain, the majority of retailers in the local markets were women, while the men did the wholesale and transportation functions.
Sweet Potato
Two scenarios were observed in Kisii in relation to gender participation in potato production and sales. In the Mosocho area where sweet potato is highly commercialised both men and women were involved in the production processes and post-harvest systems of grading and selling (see table 21). It was also observed that women form the majority of traders in both the local and distant markets. For the distant markets in major towns such as Nakuru, Nairobi and Mombasa, two or three women or a combination of women and men join up and hire a lorry to transport sweet potato to the chosen destination. This may be happening either because one person may not be able to purchase enough produce to fill a whole truck, due to fear of handling large amounts of a highly perishable crop, or due to limited resources among the traders, most of whom are women.
In the Marani division which is further away from the market centres, farmers grow sweet potatoes for home consumption and for local markets. As such it is purely a woman's crop and the men were not interested in the activities related to sweet potatoes.
Table 21: Division of labour in sweet potato production and post-harvest operations
|
Operation |
Family labour |
Hired labour |
||
|
women |
men |
women |
men |
|
|
planting |
x |
x |
x |
x |
|
weeding |
x |
x |
x |
x |
|
harvesting |
x |
x |
x |
x |
|
processing |
x |
|
|
|
|
sorting |
x |
x |
|
|
|
marketing at farm level |
x |
x |
|
|
|
packaging |
|
x |
|
|
|
selling at local market |
xxx |
|
|
|
|
selling at major markets |
xxx |
x |
|
|
|
retailing |
xxx |
|
|
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Key: x = low, xx = medium, xxx = high intensity of involvementSource: authors' compilation
The entry barriers to both the potato and sweet potato trade by women, may be associated with the initial capital requirements. A beginner requires enough cash to hire a lorry and also to buy the produce. She also has to deal with the cultural expectations as to the role of a woman. Secondly she must struggle to penetrate this male dominated business of transportation.
